Transforming Rehabilitation

Summary of Responses
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Introduction

1. The Ministry of Justice published the consultation paper “Transforming Rehabilitation – a revolution in the way we manage offenders” on 9 January 2013. This document provides a summary of the main themes emerging in response to the consultation questions and indicates the direction the Ministry of Justice intends to take, following consideration of the views expressed. Full details of the Ministry’s planned strategy for reform are set out in the consultation response document, entitled Transforming Rehabilitation – A Strategy for Reform.

2. In total, we received 598 formal responses to “Transforming Rehabilitation – a revolution in the way we manage offenders”. The appendix to this summary paper provides further details of those who responded to the consultation.
Achieving the most with Government spending on offenders

3. We asked:

| Question B1: How can we maximise the results we get from our collective Government and public sector resources? |
| Question B2: How can we use the reform of offender services in the community to enhance the broader range of social justice outcomes for individuals? |

4. Responses to Question B1 consistently said that probation providers would need to integrate effectively into existing local partnerships. Some noted it could be challenging for nationally commissioned probation services to complement other services commissioned at the local level.

5. Another clear message was that open communication and information sharing would be important for achieving improved results. Information would need to flow quickly and securely between providers and around the system. We will work to ensure that ICT systems support the transition to the new delivery model, and that contractual conditions are in place to ensure our information assurance requirements are met.

6. Respondents said that transparency about effective interventions and accurate performance data would help providers concentrate on what works to reduce reoffending. We have been working to improve the evidence base in relation to reducing re-offending, and have decided to publish a summary of current research on what works to help potential providers to plan new service delivery. We have also set up a Justice Data Lab to allow all organisations working with offenders to better understand the impact that their work has had.

7. Responses to Question B2 suggested that extending mandatory rehabilitation services to short sentenced prisoners would lead to considerable social benefits. Starting this work in prison prior to each individual’s release would increase the chance of success. There was support for more use of restorative justice approaches to support rehabilitation and better outcomes for victims.

8. Some respondents thought that by giving responsibility for offender management for many offenders to market providers and for others to the public sector, there was a possibility of fragmentation in delivery and an increase in risk. Competing services for the majority of offenders in the community is central to our reforms. We believe that opening up services to a more diverse range of providers, incentivised through payment by results, will create a system which provides the opportunity to reduce reoffending; and it is only through this reform that we can achieve the efficiencies that will enable us to extend rehabilitation provision to short-sentenced prisoners. We also continue to believe it is right that the offenders who pose the highest risk of harm to the public should be managed by the public sector probation service.
9. We recognise that communication and co-operative working between the public sector probation service and competed providers will be crucial to making the system work. We will ensure that our reformed system protects the public effectively, through reserving some functions to the public sector probation service and putting in place arrangements for new contracted providers to work cohesively with the public sector probation service, together with assurance of effective risk management undertaken by MoJ contract managers.

10. Probation providers will need to work in close partnership with a variety of local organisations and structures. At the competition stage, bidders will be required to explain their proposed approach to partnership working and we will use commissioning and contract management processes to ensure this takes place. We have designed a national commissioning model that will be informed by local intelligence to provide services that respond to regional needs.
Building new flexibility into the delivery of community orders

11. We asked:

Question B3: Should any additional flexibility be built into the community sentencing framework to strengthen the rehabilitative impact of community orders, and the reintegration of offenders into society?

12. Responses were generally supportive of increased flexibility in the delivery of community sentences, with a ‘one size fits all’ approach considered unlikely to be effective. A number of respondents called for increased discretion for probation professionals in delivering rehabilitative services, and a request that operational guidance and bureaucratic burdens should be kept to a minimum. Some respondents suggested that new flexibility around breach decisions could help improve compliance with community sentences.

13. Whilst greater flexibility was broadly welcomed, some respondents commented that the system would need to retain certainty in sentencing to give victims confidence that justice would be done. A number of judges and magistrates felt that the existing framework already provided flexibility, and there were some who thought that any additional flexibility should not allow the sentence of the court to be varied.

14. We have given careful consideration to these views in developing our proposals. We have decided to introduce legislation to amend the community sentencing framework to provide additional flexibility in delivery, the main feature of which will be the introduction of a new single rehabilitation activity requirement, which will be imposed by the court as part of a community order or suspended sentence order. The public sector will decide on action in relation to all potential breaches and provide advice on appropriate sanctions or recall to custody.
Contract specification

15. We asked:

**Question C1:** We are minded to introduce 16 Contract Package Areas. Do you think this is the right number to support effective delivery of rehabilitation services? Do you have any views on how the Contract Package Area boundaries should be drawn?

16. We received a wide range of views about the constitution of the Contract Package Areas, with arguments made for both increasing and reducing the total number. Those in favour of a smaller number of Areas suggested this would reduce the volume of offenders who might transfer between providers, limit the different interfaces between probation providers and other public service organisations, and increase the potential for efficiency savings as a result of competition. Those arguing for increasing the number of Areas suggested that services that were more responsive and accountable at the local level, with a greater diversity of probation providers.

17. We have decided on a configuration of 21 Contract Package Areas. Each of the Areas remains of a size and value that we can be confident of driving savings through competition, with sufficient offender volumes to support payment by results. The new configuration creates some new, smaller Areas, potentially broadening the range of interested bidders.

18. The boundaries have been drawn so that they are coterminous with those for other local delivery partners and co-commissioners and with a view to minimising disruption to existing delivery arrangements. This configuration should be compatible with planned changes to the prison estate aimed at designating ‘resettlement prisons’ for each Area to support ‘through the gate’ delivery of rehabilitation services.

19. We asked:

**Question C2:** What payment by results payment structure would offer the right balance between provider incentive and financial risk transfer?

**Question C3:** What measurements and pricing structures would incentivise providers to work with all offenders including the most prolific?

20. There was general comment about a limited evidence base for payment by results. Many respondents considered that smaller organisations would be unable to enter into contracts where a significant proportion of funding was placed at risk. It was argued that the proportion of ‘at risk’ funding should be limited to ensure that sufficient guaranteed funding was available to deliver the sentence of the court.

21. Respondents commented that the payment mechanism should avoid motivating providers to ‘cherry pick’ offenders who were easiest to help, and should not result in unequal provision for different offender groups. Many argued that a simple binary measure would ignore the reality that rehabilitating offenders is often a gradual process. A range of alternative measures were proposed.
22. We have considered the responses received, and the learning to date from our payment by results pilots. Key features of our proposed payment structure include a ‘fee for service’ element aimed at guaranteeing certain activities are delivered, with a further payment dependent on reducing reoffending. Providers will be rewarded with success payments primarily when they achieve an offender’s complete desistance from crime for a 12 month period. However, our payment mechanism will also take into account the total number of re-offences committed by the cohort of offenders with which each provider is working, so that providers are incentivised not to neglect the most difficult offenders and those who have already reoffended. For providers to be paid in full, they will need to achieve a sufficient reduction in the number of offenders returning to crime, as well as reduce the volume of reoffending by those offenders for which they are responsible.

23. We asked:

| Question C4: How should we specify public sector oversight requirements in contracts, to avoid bureaucracy but ensure effective public protection arrangements? |

24. Consultees felt that effective public protection arrangements would be dependent on the quick, secure flow of information around the system. The responsibilities and accountabilities of all parties would need to be entirely clear. Some were concerned that the expected diversity of probation providers would make public sector oversight difficult, and it was suggested that local criminal justice partnerships should be involved in overseeing delivery. Probation officers in particular commented that a clearly defined process for managing rapid changes in offender risk would be required.

25. We have designed a model which we believe will provide an effective response to managing the risk of harm posed by offenders. The public sector will assess the risk level of all offenders, with those considered to be at high risk of causing serious harm continuing to be managed by the public sector. The remaining majority of offenders will be allocated to a lead provider, who will be contractually required to inform the public in cases where an individual’s risk level is potentially escalating to ‘high’. Both the public sector probation service and the contracted providers will have responsibilities for management of the risk of serious harm to the public in relation to the cases on their respective caseloads. Where a case escalates to a high risk of serious harm it will become the responsibility of the public sector probation service, which will then decide how the case is handled in future.

26. We are also putting in place a set of additional measures to ensure that the new public sector probation service can exercise its role in protecting the public effectively: the public sector probation service will have the ability to specify at the assessment stage a number of triggers which would require further risk assessment, and for those cases which are finely balanced between the medium and high risk of serious harm categories (either at initial allocation or subsequent reassessment), they will carry out renewed risk assessments at given times.

27. The public sector probation service will be able to undertake renewed risk assessments when a case is raised with them by providers where there is a significant change in the offender’s circumstances. We recognise the importance of continuity in offender management, and propose that escalating risk of harm should not automatically mean that day to day contact with an offender will transfer to the public
sector. Where appropriate, the competed provider may continue to work with the offender, under the direction of the public sector.

28. We asked:

**Question C5:** We want to incentivise through the gate provision, but some prisoners will disperse to a different part of the country following release. How can we best account for that in contract design?

29. This question generated a variety of responses. However, a common view was that it would be important to ensure providers cooperate and share information in cases where offenders transfer between providers. It was thought that prisons should share the same responsibilities for reducing reoffending as community providers. Many respondents argued that offenders should be transferred to a prison close to their home address in the weeks prior to their release to facilitate effective ‘through the gate’ support.

30. Under our proposals, the lead provider in each Contract Package Area will be responsible for delivering rehabilitation services in custody and the community. To facilitate this work, we will designate specific ‘resettlement’ prisons for each Area from which the vast majority of offenders returning to the Area will be released. Rationalising the number of prisons in which a provider is required to work and improving their access to offenders in custody will strengthen resettlement activity to support the transition between custody and the community. Further details of our intended approach are set out in our strategy for reform.

31. We asked:

**Question C6:** What mechanisms can be used to incentivise excellent performance and robustly manage poor performance to ensure good value for money?

32. Responses to this question clearly supported a system of sanctions and rewards for providers based on their level of performance. Many argued that this should include a system of financial bonuses for effective providers, and scope to change or terminate contracts, levy financial penalties or bar providers from future competitions if services are not delivered to the required standard.

33. Transparency about performance standards would be important, with many potential providers requesting clarity about what both good and poor performance looks like. Contract management arrangements should follow best practice, with regular review processes important to ensure that services are being delivered to the appropriate standard. There were calls to ensure that staff working within the system are properly trained and qualified.

34. Our approach to ensuring high quality services will be to require contracted providers and the public sector probation service to adhere to a set of national minimum standards, and for all parties to follow robust internal quality assurance processes. Contracts with providers will be managed by the Ministry of Justice/NOMS through an account management structure, with the responsibilities and performance standards for the public sector probation service to be established in Service Level Agreements.
Supply chain management

35. We asked:

| Question C7: | What steps should we take to ensure that lead providers manage and maintain a truly diverse supply chain in a fair, sustainable and transparent manner? |
| Question C8: | What processes should be established to ensure that supply chain mismanagement is addressed? |
| Question C9: | How can we ensure that the voluntary and community sector is able to participate in the new system in a fair and meaningful way? |

36. Many respondents supported the development of supply chain protocols similar to the Department for Work and Pension’s Merlin standard. A number suggested that there should be restrictions placed on the degree of financial risk transferred by lead providers to members of their supply chain. Responses from Trade Unions and Professional Associations argued that the public sector probation service should be enabled to compete to deliver services.

37. The voluntary, community and social enterprise sector requested that lead providers’ approach to supply chain management should be scrutinised during competition and that ongoing oversight of supply chains in operation would be important. Many responses emphasised the importance of transparency in supply chains, and it was suggested that the Ministry of Justice should engage directly with supply chain organisations and provide a confidential and direct feedback route.

38. The Ministry of Justice was asked to facilitate contact between lead providers and potential supply chain organisations. Suggestions for this included the development of a standard ‘expression of interest’ form for smaller organisations, and the creation of a register of local organisations with a proven track record of delivering services for offenders.

39. Nearly all of the responses received stressed the importance of a significant voluntary and community sector presence in the new probation market. A recurring theme was that the Ministry of Justice should provide support and funding to help equip voluntary sector organisations with the skills and capabilities needed to compete for contracts, either individually or in joint venture partnerships or consortia with other organisations.

40. Voluntary community and social enterprise sector organisations in particular suggested that the Ministry of Justice should commission independent financial guidance, support access to social investment, and make targeted direct investment. Contract duration would be a major factor for the sector, with longer term contracts providing a clear incentive to participate. Some respondents argued that an alternative, local approach to commissioning would improve voluntary and community sector involvement.
41. We have taken these views on board, and our strategy for reform sets out in detail a series of practical steps that we propose to take to support the involvement of small and medium enterprises and voluntary organisations. These include investing in capacity building activity and reducing the administrative burden to promote engagement in competition, and an approach to market stewardship aimed at ensuring meaningful and sustained involvement of smaller providers. Our proposals also include the introduction of ‘market standard’ contracts, which will aid transparency in supply chains.
Legislative changes

42. We asked:

| Question C10: How can we best use statutory supervision on release from custody to ensure that offenders engage with rehabilitation effectively? |
| Question C11: How can we ensure consequences for non-compliance are effective, without building in significant additional cost? |

43. Responses to Question C10 indicated strong support from all sectors for extending rehabilitation services to prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months in custody. However, there were a range of views about how statutory supervision should be implemented, with calls from a number of sectors for probation professionals to have freedom to exercise judgement about what services would best suit individual offenders’ needs. Some suggested that voluntary supervision arrangements would deliver improved value for money.

44. Responses to Question C11 suggested that professional discretion should also influence the sanctions that are taken with offenders who fail to comply with supervision. Many suggested that these should be flexible, with return to custody only available as a final option after other sanctions had failed, rather than an automatic response in every case. However, Probation Trusts and sentencers felt that working within a flexible framework, sanctions would need to provide a swift, robust and transparent response to non-compliance.

45. A number of respondents commented that payment by results must not introduce perverse incentives for providers to breach offenders. Local Authorities and other local criminal justice partnerships pointed to the potential for extending and enforcing supervision requirements to impose new burdens on the wider criminal justice system.

46. We remain convinced of the importance of ensuring that all offenders released from prison receive mandatory oversight in the community. This support will be guaranteed through legislation to ensure we target the hardest to reach and most prolific offenders. The conditions attached to mandatory supervision will be geared towards rehabilitation rather than punishment, with discretion for providers to identify the activities that should be carried out. We propose to adopt a range of sanctions to address non-compliance with supervision, only recalling offenders to custody as a final measure. We believe these will provide an effective response to offenders who are failing to meet the terms of their sentence, whilst helping to minimise costs to the system.
System design

47. We asked:

Question C12: Given our proposals for the commissioning structure and the proposed responsibilities of the public sector, what kind of delivery structure would be most appropriate for the public sector probation service?

48. The majority of responses to this question recognised that an alternative to the existing Probation Trust structure would be required under the new model. Many said that clear lines of accountability would be needed across the system, supported by close working relationships between the public sector and contracted providers. The respective roles and responsibilities of the public sector and contracted providers would need to be clearly stated.

49. Comments received from Probation Trusts noted that retaining a local delivery structure would be the most important element of the public sector design. Some argued in favour of a structure that mirrored the proposed Contract Package Areas, whilst others pointed to the potential for increased efficiency savings to be realised through a configuration of significantly fewer Trusts. Some responses from the voluntary community and social enterprise sector suggested that a national delivery structure would be most appropriate given the proposed function of the public sector and plans for regional competition of other probation services. Responses generally stressed the importance of ensuring that the new system provided continuity of offender supervision and ensured that providers from all sectors covered the range of local partnership working currently undertaken by Trusts.

50. Our plans for the future structure of the public sector probation service are detailed in our strategy for reform. The proposal for a new National Probation Service managed directly by NOMS has been informed by respondents’ views, the requirements of the wider criminal justice system and the need to generate efficiency savings to reinvest in rehabilitation services. Within this national service, we understand the importance of ensuring that services continue to reflect local need. Below the national level, we proposed to create a structure that aligns as far as possible with other public services boundaries without disrupting pre-existing partnerships. A Local Delivery Unit network will provide a local focus on service delivery and help develop strategic and operational relationships with local partners. The public sector probation service will have a distinct identity for Wales, facilitating links and relationships with the Welsh Government.

51. We asked:

Question C13: What else can we do to ensure the new system makes best use of local expertise and arrangements, and integrates into existing local structures and provision?

52. Many respondents said that the proposed reforms would need to integrate with existing local partnerships and relationships rather than seek to introduce new
arrangements. It was suggested that providers wishing to bid for rehabilitation services should be required as part of the competition to demonstrate an understanding of local structures and needs, and explain how their services will complement these. A number of respondents argued strongly that the effectiveness of Community Safety Partnerships, Integrated Offender Management arrangements and other local structures must not be diminished by the reforms.

53. Responses from Probation Trusts, the voluntary community and social enterprise sector and local criminal justice partnerships argued that delivery networks needed to be flexible to respond to local needs. It was noted that community safety issues are not uniform across the country and the proposed national commissioning process must respond to the needs of individual areas.

54. We recognise the importance of ensuring that the services we will commission meet the needs of local areas. We have developed a commissioning model that we believe will enable us to achieve this, building on intelligence provided by local probation delivery units and other service providers, whilst joining up with other commissioning activity. We will use the commissioning and contract management mechanisms to ensure that probation services complement existing local delivery partnerships.

55. We asked:

| Question C14: Police and Crime Commissioners will play an integral role in our reforms. How best can we maximise their input/involvement and that of other key partners locally? |

56. Responses to this question indicated considerable support for Police and Crime Commissioner involvement in rehabilitation services, with a number of different views about what their role should be.

57. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) themselves broadly welcomed the proposals set out in Transforming Rehabilitation, but wanted closer alignment between Contract Package Areas and individual Police Force boundaries. They also argued that responsibility for commissioning rehabilitation services should be part of the PCC role to allow them to hold local providers to account, a proposals supported by some Probation Trusts, Local Authorities and local criminal justice partnerships. Many agreed in principle with the idea of PCCs co-commissioning rehabilitation services, but felt that this should be considered as an option for future contracts. There was broad agreement that PCCs should have a role in scrutinising the system, with a number of respondents arguing that they should monitor the effectiveness of contracts and service provision to ensure local needs are met.

58. Our reforms will include a substantive role for PCCs in setting the direction for rehabilitation services. Our final Contract Package Areas have been designed to align as far as possible with PCC boundaries, with several Areas mapping directly onto individual PCC areas. We will engage with PCCs during the competition stage, to ensure that their strategic crime plans can inform our commissioning priorities, and we are considering what requirements might be inserted into provider contracts to ensure due regard is paid to crime plans and other local strategies. PCCs will be able to commission rehabilitation providers to deliver additional services in line with their own priorities through co-commissioning, and we remain open to them taking on a greater commissioning role in the future.
59. We asked:

| Question C15: How can we ensure that professional standards are maintained and that the quality of training and accreditation is assured? A professional body or institute has been suggested as one way of achieving this. What are your views on the benefits of this approach and on the practicalities of establishing such arrangements, including how costs might be met? |
| Question C16: What role can the Inspectorate of Probation best play in assuring effective practice and a high standard of service delivery? |

60. Responses to Question 15 emphasised the importance of maintaining professional standards under the proposed reforms. There was broad support for establishing a professional body or institute to ensure existing professional standards are maintained, with some Trade Unions and professional associations suggesting a further role in training and accrediting staff.

61. Drawing on the responses from the Punishment and Reform and Transforming Rehabilitation consultations, we are developing our approach to maintaining professional standards and quality training across the system. We plan to proceed with the creation of a professional body, and want to design this in partnership with existing probation professionals. During competition, potential providers will need to demonstrate how they will maintain sufficient levels of training and competence across their workforce.

62. Question 16 generated strong support for HM Inspectorate of Probation to have a significant role in the new system. Many respondents suggested that this should involve monitoring the work of probation service providers, reinforced by a contractual requirement for providers to engage with the Inspectorate. We will ask the Inspectorate to continue inspecting the system as a whole, and will ensure it has the powers required to access necessary information held by providers.
Equality implications

63. We asked:

| Question C17: How can we use this new commissioning model, including payment by results, to ensure better outcomes for female offenders and others with complex needs or protected characteristics? |
| Question C18: What are the likely impacts of our proposals on groups with protected characteristics? Please let us have any examples, case studies, research or other types of evidence to support your views. |

64. The main theme to emerge from these questions was a general observation that paying by results across a cohort of offenders would lead providers to develop homogenous services that fail to recognise the requirements of some offenders with complex needs or particular protected characteristics. Respondents generally expressed support for increased specification of services for some offenders and there were a number who suggested that services for women offenders especially should be subject to specific commissioning arrangements. We noted comments that offenders with complex needs often required intensive long term support, and the suggestion from some private sector responses that particular offenders should attract higher reward payments.

65. We intend to proceed with our plans for commissioning all rehabilitation services across geographical areas under a single contract, rather than competing services separately for different groups of offenders. This will be important for ensuring that we can minimise duplication and reduce costs across the system. We will use the commissioning and contract management process to ensure that the system responds to the recognised needs of offenders with particular protected characteristics. In particular, we will expect providers to be able to articulate and respond to the needs of women offenders where these differ from men.

66. Trade Unions and professional associations raised concerns that the competition for probation services could lead to unequal treatment of certain groups within the current Probation workforce, especially for women and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) staff.

67. We are mindful that our plans have the potential to affect individuals and groups of staff differently across the existing Probation workforce. We will keep this under review and will seek to identify and mitigate any disproportionate impacts that arise for particular staff groups.
Annex A: List of respondents

The respondents to the consultation included individual probation officers, academics, parliamentarians, members of the public and members or representatives of the following organisations:

A4E
ACEVO (Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations)
ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers)
Action for Prisoners’ Families
Adfam
Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc
Alliantist
Amey
Anawim
Arts Alliance
Asha Women’s Centre
Asian Women’s Resource Centre
Association of Black Probation Officers – London
Association of Employment and Learning Providers
Association of North East Councils
Association of Policing and Crime Chief Executives
Association of Youth Offending Team Managers.
Association of Retired Chief Officers and Inspectors of Probation
ATQ Consultants LLP
Avanta
Avon and Somerset Criminal Justice Board
Avon and Somerset Probation Trust
Backstop
Bail for Immigration Detainees
Bailey Nicholson Grayson Solicitors
Barking and Dagenham Community Safety Partnership
Barony Consulting Group
Bates Wells and Braithwaite London LLP Consultancy
Bedfordshire Probation Trust
Belong London
Betel of Britain
Big Society Capital
Black Training and Enterprise Group
Blackburn with Darwen Safeguarding Adults Board and Lancashire Safeguarding Adults Board
Blue Sky Development and Regeneration
Bradford and Keighley Magistrates Bench
Bridges Ventures LLP
Bridging the Gap (Islington)
Brighton Women’s Centre
British Association of Social Workers
British Psychological Society
Bury County Council
Calderdale Community Safety Partnership
Calderstones NHS Foundation Trust
Cambridge Women’s Resources Centre
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Probation Trust
Cambridgeshire Criminal Justice Board
Capita
Carillion
Caritas Social Action Network
CBI (Confederation of British Industry)
Central and South West Staffordshire Magistrates’ Bench
Central Bedfordshire Council
Centre for Education in the Criminal Justice System
Centre for Justice Innovation
Centre for Public Scrutiny
Cerebra
Charities Aid Foundation
Cheshire Probation Trust
Cheshire Probation Trust Stakeholders
Cheshire West and Chester Local Safeguarding Children Board
Chief Constable for West Mercia
Chorley Bench
Chorley Council
Chwarae Teg
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<td>Citizens Advice</td>
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<td>Clinks</td>
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<td>Commonweal Housing</td>
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<td>Community Chaplaincy Association</td>
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<td>Community Housing Aid</td>
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<td>Community Matters and NCVYS (National Council for Voluntary Youth Services)</td>
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G4S Care and Justice Services
Gateshead Community Safety Board
Gateshead Local Safeguarding Children Board
Gloucestershire Probation Trust
GMB/Scoop
Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisations
Greater Manchester Probation Trust
Gwent Bench
Hammer and Tong Productions
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Judicial Issues Group
Hampshire County Council
Hampshire Probation Trust
Hartlepool Borough Council
Havering Community Safety Partnership
Her Centre
Hertfordshire Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
Hertfordshire County Council
Hertfordshire Criminal Justice Boards
Hertfordshire Probation Trust
Hestia
High Sheriff of Cornwall
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
HM Chief Inspector of Probation
Homeless Link
Howard League for Penal Reform
Humberside Probation Trust
Independent Probation Alliance
Information Commissioner’s Office
Ingeus
Interserve Justice
Justices’ Clerks Society
Karen Page Associates
Kent County Council
Kent Probation Trust
Lambeth Mediation Service
Lancashire Probation Trust
Lancaster City Council
Langley House Trust
Laurus OD Solutions
Leeds Community Safety Partnership
Leeds Youth Offending Service
Leicester Safeguarding Children and Adults Boards
Leicestershire and Rutland Probation Trust
Lewisham Borough Council
LGIU (Local Government Information Unit)
Lincolnshire County Council
Lincolnshire Probation Trust
Lincolnshire Youth Offending Service
Liverpool Church of England Council for Social Aid
Local Government Association Safer Communities Board
Local Solutions
Locality
London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster City Council
London Councils
London Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
London Probation Trust
London Voluntary Service Council
Magistrates’ Association
Magistrates’ Association – Norfolk Branch
Magistrates’ Association – Wiltshire Branch
Make Justice Work
Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime – London
Medway Youth Offending Team
MegaNexus Limited
Melton Borough Council
Mentoring and Befriending Foundation
Merlin Advisory Board
Merseyside Probation Trust
Midland Heart
MITIE
Nacro
NAPO (National Association of Probation Officers)
NAPO (Cumbria Branch)
NAPO (Greater London Branch)
NAPO (Staffordshire and West Midlands Branch)
NAPO (West Yorkshire Branch)
National Approved Premises Association
National Audit Office
National Bench Chairmen’s Forum
National Council for Volunteer Organisations
National Disabled Staff Network
NCG (Newcastle College Group)
NEPACS (North East Prison After Care Society)
No Offence!
Norfolk and Suffolk Criminal Justice Board
Norfolk and Suffolk Probation Trust
Norfolk Training Services Ltd
North East Suffolk Magistrates
North Somerset People and Communities Board and the North Somerset Reducing Reoffending Board
North West London Magistrates Probation Liaison Forum
Northamptonshire Probation Trust
Northern Rock Foundation
Northumbria Probation Trust
Nottinghamshire Probation Trust
Nottinghamshire County Council
NPC (New Philanthropy Capital)
Only Connect London
Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-owned Business
P3
Pact
Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Avon and Somerset
PCC for Bedfordshire
PCC for Cambridgeshire
PCC for Cheshire
PCC for Cleveland.
PCC for Cumbria
PCC for Cumbria
PCC for Derbyshire
PCC for Devon and Cornwall
PCC for Dorset
PCC for Durham
PCC for Dyfed-Powys (joint response with PCCs for Gwent, North Wales and South Wales)
PCC for Gloucestershire
PCC for Greater Manchester
PCC for Gwent (joint response with PCCs for Dyfed-Powys, North Wales and South Wales)
PCC for Hertfordshire
PCC for Humberside
PCC for Lancashire
PCC for Leicestershire
PCC for Lincolnshire
PCC for North Wales (joint response with PCCs for Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and South Wales)
PCC for Northamptonshire
PCC for Northumbria
PCC for South Wales (joint response with PCCs for Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and North Wales)
PCC for Staffordshire
PCC for Suffolk
PCC for Surrey
PCC for Sussex
PCC for Warwickshire
PCC for West Midlands
PCC for West Midlands
PCC for West Yorkshire
PCC for Wiltshire and Swindon
PCM (OFS) Ltd
Pertemps People Development Group
Plymouth City Council
POPS (Partners of Prisoners and Families Support Group)
Positive Justice Gloucestershire
Preston City Council
Transforming Rehabilitation Summary of Responses

Prison Governors Association
Prison Radio Association
Prison Reform Trust
Prison Reform Trust: Reforming Women’s Justice
Prisoners’ Education Trust
Probation Association and Probation Chiefs Association
Prospects
Queen Elizabeth’s Foundation for Disabled People
Redcar and Cleveland Community Safety Partnership
Redcar and Cleveland Local Safeguarding Children Board
Reed in Partnership
Rehabilitation Partnership (UK) Limited
Resolve (BMS) Ltd
Restorative Justice Council
Revolving Doors Agency
Ripon and Leeds Diocesan Council for Social Cohesion
Saadian
Safe Durham Partnership
Safe Ground
Safe Newcastle Partnership Response
Safer Doncaster Partnership
Safer Northumberland Partnership and Northumberland County Council
Safer Peterborough Partnership
Safer Portsmouth Partnership
Safer Solihull Partnership
Safer Stockton Partnership
Shaw Trust and Careers Development Group
Sheffield Youth Justice Service
Shrewsbury and North Shropshire Justices
Shropshire Council
Simple Living UK
Skills for Justice
SOCA (Serious Organised Crime Agency)
Social Enterprise UK
Social Finance Ltd
Social Firms UK
Social Investment Business Group
SocialPioneers
Sodexo Justice Services
Somerset Drug and Alcohol Partnership
South East London Bench
South Yorkshire Probation Trust
Southern Derbyshire Bench
Southwark Council
Sova (Supporting Others through Volunteer Action)
Spark Inside
St Helens Council
St Mungo’s
St Vincent De Paul Society
St. Albans Responsibility Authorities Group
St. Giles Trust
Staffordshire and West Midlands Probation Trust
Staffordshire County Council
Steria
Stockton-on-Tees Local Safeguarding Children Board
Stonham
Sunderland Safeguarding Children Board
Surrey and Sussex Probation Trust
Surrey County Council
Swansea Safeguarding Children Board
Switchback
Teesside and Hartlepool Magistrates
Telford and South Shropshire Bench
Thames Valley Criminal Justice Board
Thames Valley Police
Thames Valley Probation Trust
The Alliance (Serco, Catch 22, Turning Point)
The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
The Big Life Group
The Big Lottery Fund
The Bit Commons
The Business Services Association
The Council of H.M. Circuit Judges
The Cyrenians
The Disabilities Trust
The Employment and Skills Group
The Foundation for Social Improvement
The Grow Organisation and Mow and Grow
The Law Society
The Nehemiah Project
The Nelson Trust
The Parole Board
The Prince’s Trust
The Rehabilitation Partnership
The Royal College of Psychiatrists
The Salvation Army
Trailblazers
Transition to Adulthood Alliance
Tyne Housing Association Ltd
Unilink Software
Unison
User Voice
Victim Support
Wakefield and Pontefract Magistrates
Wales Council for Voluntary Action
Wales Probation Trust
Walsall Community Chaplaincy Project
Warwickshire Probation Trust
Welsh Language Commissioner
West and Central Hertfordshire Bench
West London Bench
West Mercia Probation Trust
West Mercia Youth Offending Service
West Suffolk Magistrates
West Sussex County Council
West Sussex Local Safeguarding Children Board
West Sussex Youth Offending Service
West Yorkshire Community Chaplaincy Project
West Yorkshire Probation Trust
Westminster Drug Project
Wiltshire Community Safety Partnership
Wiltshire Criminal Justice Board
Wiltshire Magistrates’ Benches
Wiltshire Probation Trust
Wolverhampton City Council/Safer Wolverhampton Partnership
Women in Prison
women@thewell
WomenCentre Calderdale and Kirklees
Women’s Breakout
Women’s Resource Centre
Worcestershire County Council
Work Solutions
Working Chance
Working Links
YMCA Wales
York and North Yorkshire Probation Trust
Youth Justice Board