Closes 29 Nov 2024
This service needs cookies enabled.
We provisionally propose that appeals from first instance contempt decisions of either division of the Court of Appeal should lie to the Supreme Court.
Do consultees agree?
We provisionally propose that appeals from first instance contempt decisions of the Supreme Court should lie to a non-conflicted (though not necessarily larger) panel of the Supreme Court.
We invite consultees’ views on the following options for streamlining routes of appeal from first instance decisions of courts and tribunals (other than the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court).
Which of the following do consultees prefer:
We provisionally propose that permission should be required to appeal against a finding of contempt or against a sanction imposed for contempt, other than where the appeal is from a magistrates’ court.
We provisionally propose that, other than for first appeals to the Supreme Court, where appeals against contempt decisions or orders require permission then the tests for permission should be the same as those that currently apply in civil and criminal courts.
The effect of this would be the following:
We provisionally propose that the test for permission for a first appeal to the Supreme Court should be whether the appellant has a real prospect of success.
Should the Attorney General be able to appeal in contempt cases where they are an applicant?
If the Attorney General should be able to appeal in cases where they are an applicant, should there be any restrictions on what aspects of a decision or order they may appeal?
Where contempt proceedings were instituted on the court’s own motion and proceedings have concluded, should the Attorney General be able to make a reference to the Court of Appeal on a point of law?
Where contempt proceedings were instituted on application by the Attorney General, and if the Attorney General’s right to appeal were to be abolished, should the Attorney General instead be able to make a reference to the Court of Appeal on a point of law?
